Per-Olov Johansson, Ginés de Rus, 15/12/15
How to evaluate the benefits and costs of foreign consumers, foreign producers, and local firms owned by foreigners, seems to cause confusion among cost‑benefit practitioners. The screening of the literature and an informal search of the most influential cost‑benefit guidelines found no evidence that this issue has been addressed previously, consisting the standard approach in overlooking the benefits of foreigners, with some minor qualifications. Sometimes the practitioner gives standing to non‑nationals, though the implicit reason of their inclusion is the practical difficulties of disentangling the surpluses of nationals and foreigners. Usually, there is not an explicit discussion of the question. This paper addresses the issue on standing in cost‑benefit analysis. The distinction between the indirect utility function of national and non‑national allows the consideration of some relevant cases for the economic evaluation of projects. These are the polar case of zero weights to foreign consumers and foreign companies shipping their producer surpluses abroad, the case of local firms owned by foreigners, the altruist local household case, the consequence of fixed factors for the evaluation of foreign surpluses and the case of transnational projects with asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits.
Ginés de Rus, 31/10/14
Infrastructure investment is an inter‑temporal decision through which society foregoes its current wellbeing for the future. In the economic assessment of this trade‑off, the practical standard method is cost‑benefit analysis, which compares the social benefits and costs of the decision. Furthermore, a sound exercise of economic evaluation requires an approach that incorporates other unavoidable trade‑offs related to pricing, such as charging short‑run vs long‑run marginal cost or the consequences of budget constraints on the net social value of the investment; intermodal competition and public investment; institutional design and the choice of contracts; and in a particularly important but somewhat neglected point, the long‑term consequences of investment decisions. This paper addresses the economic content of this set of essential trade‑offs and discusses their inclusion in the economic evaluation of major projects.
Ginés de Rus, 13/10/15
La política de infraestructuras necesita de la ingeniería, el derecho y la economía. De estos tres ingredientes, el tercero ha estado particularmente escaso en nuestro país. Los avances económicos en materia de información asimétrica, diseño de mecanismos, teoría de la regulación o incluso el análisis coste-beneficio básico, no parecen haber jugado un papel relevante en el diseño de las políticas de transporte de las sucesivas administraciones españolas, con los consiguientes costes en forma de duplicidades, descoordinación entre las políticas por modos de transporte y excesos de capacidad. En este trabajo se analiza el papel del Estado en la provisión de infraestructuras y se contemplan las tres posibilidades de participación del sector privado en su provisión, analizando la provisión directa por el sector público con mínima implicación privada (como en la alta velocidad ferroviaria), la cooperación público-privada (las concesiones de autopistas) y la privatización (aeropuertos). Del análisis se extraen algunas recomendaciones sobre las líneas generales de una política de infraestructuras basada en la búsqueda del máximo beneficio social y sobre la estructura óptima del Ministerio que debería gestionarlas.
Trade-offs between environmental regulation and market competition: airlines, emission trading systems and entry deterrence
Cristina Barbot, Ofelia Betancor, M. Pilar Socorro y M. Fernanda Viecens, 26/09/12
Emission trading systems (ETS) are being applied worldwide and in different economic sectors as an environmental regulatory tool that induces reductions of CO2 emissions. In Europe such a system is in place since 2005 for energy intensive installations and, since 1st January 2012, for airlines with flights arriving and departing from Community airports. The efficiency of the system should consider not only how it allows reaching an environmental goal, but also it should take into account its implications for market competition. In this work we develop a theoretical model that analyses the European ETS’s main features as devised for airlines, focusing on its effects on potential competition and entry deterrence. Contrary to other economic activities under ETS, potential competition is usual in most airline markets. Our results indicate that the share of capped allowances allocated initially for free to air operators may be a key element in deterring or allowing entry into the market. This result may be in collision with the general European principle of promoting competition and may represent a step backwards in the construction of a single European air transport market.