



Competition in Rail Passenger Services

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- 1. Background**
- 2. Experience of competition**
 - on track competition**
 - franchising**
- 3. Modelling on-track competition**
- 4. Conclusions**

- EU legislation requires a degree of separation of infrastructure from operations and complete open access in the freight market
- From 2010, open access for international passenger services, but little yet running
- 4th railway package to propose opening to competition of domestic passenger services, with competitive tendering for subsidised services and open access for commercial
- Some countries have already implemented one or both of these measures



Existing on-track competition

1. Germany

Complete open access but few services (mainly in niche markets run by regional operators)

2. Britain

Open access subject to decision of the regulator; niche markets but some head on competition

Also some overlapping franchises; mainly competition between inter city and regional services

3. Sweden

Limited services only to date but complete open access

4. Italy

Head on competition on high speed routes planned

5. Austria

Head on competition planned



Example of Open Access Competition- British East Coast Mainline



- Principal trunk route from London to Leeds, York, Newcastle and Edinburgh
- First new entrant, Hull Trains, running London – Hull calling at Doncaster
- Second new entrant, Grand Central, running London - Sunderland (near Newcastle) calling at York, and London – Bradford (near Leeds) calling at Doncaster

Comparison of open access and franchised operator fares (£ September 2009) British examples



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Off peak Fares to/from London

		Open access reduction
Hull Trains	Hull	18%
	Doncaster	18%
	Grantham	11%
Grand Central	Sunderland	32%
	York	27%

(Source: Griffiths, 2009)



Effects of Open Access Competition

- **Lower fares**
- **Additional services**
- **Use of spare capacity**
- **Pressure on costs? (but loss of economies of density)**

BUT ALSO

- **Reduced profitability**
- **Poorer use of scarce capacity**
- **Loss of integration, and of other services**



Britain

All services, including inter city

Sweden

All subsidised services, including long distance

Germany, Denmark, Netherlands

Some regional services only (but also Dutch high speed line)

- **Increased traffic in all countries**
- **20-30% reduction in subsidies in Sweden and Germany**
- **But costs and subsidies increased in Britain**
- **Competitive tendering enables the maximum contribution to be made to infrastructure costs, through the premium paid for the franchise**
- **It preserves economies of density and integration of services**
- **But it might stifle innovation**



Breakdown of TOC cost rises

Drivers of TOC cost rises (£m, 2005/06 prices)	1996/97	1999/2000	2005/06
All TOCs			
Staff costs	1,132	1,104	1,607
Rolling stock leasing costs	1,028	972	1,143
Other	1,419	1,316	2,169
All	3,579	3,392	4,919
Average salary £	25,948	28,266	35,094
Headcount	43,638	39,049	45,794

Sources: TOC Annual Accounts, National Rail Trends Yearbook 2005/06 and Network Rail

Reasons for Train Operating Cost increases



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- External factors such as fuel prices, insurance, policing
- Sharp rise in labour costs as TOCs chase limited pool of skilled labour
- Inadequate incentives to control costs on short franchises
- Problems with dealing with failed TOCs

Possible solutions

- Longer franchises
- More open access competition

PRAISE Rail Operations Model



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- **Developed at University of Leeds in mid-1990s to look at potential for on-track competition.**
- **Applied in UK and two other countries**
- **Includes three elements**
 - Demand Model (logit model examining choice of mode, ticket, train, so examines overcrowding or yield management systems)
 - Cost Model (fixed and variable infrastructure and operating costs)
 - Evaluation Model (net benefits to users, operators and externalities)
 - Modelled two tactics – cream skimming and head on competition



On track competition outcomes

**Outcome depends on access charges but cream
skimming most likely**

**Head on competition only feasible where
volumes very large and/or track access
charges low**

**Outcome involves excessive service levels and
costs**

**Whilst competition may drive costs down loss of
economies of density will increase them**

New case study – international route with strong domestic market



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Scenarios

1. Entrant duplicates 2 international services per day
2. As 1 , but entrant cuts fares 10%
3. As 2 but incumbent matches fare cut
4. Entrant also duplicates domestic service



Results (% change from existing)

	Demand	Revenue	Incumbent Revenue	Fare
1.	+5.9	+3.9	-5.8	-2.5
2.	+6.6	+4.1	-6.6	-5.3
3.	+13.8	+4.1	-5.8	-8.5
4.	+37.4	+15.1	-36.2	-17.1

CONCLUSIONS

– ON TRACK COMPETITION



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Benefits

Lower fares

Improved services

Innovation

Lower costs?

BUT

Limited in impact (?)

Duplication of services

Reduced profitability

BEST WHERE

high volumes

spare capacity

Low access charges



CONCLUSIONS - FRANCHISES

Benefits

High levels of competition
Planned integrated services
Improved marketing
Reduced costs

BUT

Limited scope for innovation
Lack of competition in fares and service levels

Much depends on the skill of the franchising authority

Key issues:

- **Franchise length**
- **Freedom regarding prices and service levels**
- **Incentives (allocation of revenue risk)**