Infraestructuras, Transportes y Vivienda

Infraestructuras Aeroportuarias y Transporte Aéreo

Infraestructuras viarias

Investigación

Competencia Aeroportuaria y Modelos de Privatización

Juan Santaló, M. Pilar Socorro, 26/03/15

Los beneficios de la competencia en el sector aeroportuario son múltiples. Por un lado, una mayor competencia puede generar menores costes de operación, mejores niveles de eficiencia en el servicio, así como una mejor especialización y adaptación a las necesidades idiosincráticas de los usuarios de cada aeropuerto. Por otro lado, existe gran controversia en la literatura sobre cuál debe ser la política de regulación óptima en aeropuertos. La disciplina impuesta por una mayor competencia en el sector puede disminuir la necesidad de una regulación estricta.

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Privatización, competencia y regulación aeroportuaria: experiencia internacional

Ofelia Betancor, María Paz Espinosa, 16/03/15

En este estudio se analiza la regulación aeroportuaria y el sistema de propiedad de los aeropuertos en el mundo, incluyendo diversas opciones de participación privada. En las últimas décadas se ha producido una transición a nivel internacional desde un modelo donde los aeropuertos eran considerados utilidades públicas hasta el modelo actual donde cada vez con mayor frecuencia los aeropuertos son evaluados desde el punto de vista de la rentabilidad. Más recientemente surge con fuerza el concepto de competencia entre aeropuertos y el planteamiento de la necesidad de privatizar evitando en lo posible una regulación compleja y costosa mediante el fomento de la competencia para aquellos tráficos en los que sea factible. Este proceso se ha visto acompañado y estimulado por la liberalización de las aerolíneas.

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Vertical differentiation, schedule delay and entry deterrence: Low cost vs. full service airlines

Jorge Valido, M. Pilar Socorro y Francesca Medda, 12/07/2013

We consider a market with a full-service (FS) carrier (the incumbent) and a low-cost (LC) carrier (the potential entrant). If the LC carrier enters the market, airlines compete in ticket prices and frequency with vertically differentiated products. The higher the frequency, the lower passenger’s generalized price. Thus, more frequency allows airlines to increase ticket prices without losing demand. In this context, we show that the incumbent may increase the frequency offered in order to deter the LC carrier entry. We show that if the airport capacity is low enough the LC carrier entry can be easily blocked or deterred. However, if the airport capacity is sufficiently high, the LC carrier entry must be accommodated.

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Subsidies for resident passengers in air transport markets

Jorge Valido, M. Pilar Socorro, Aday Hernández y Ofelia Betancor, 12/11/2012

In this work, we analyse from a theoretical perspective the efficiency of an ad valorem and a lump sum subsidy for resident passengers. In particular, we consider passengers with high and low willingness to pay that may be residents in a given area (and therefore entitled to a subsidy). All passengers are served by a monopoly air carrier that wants to get as much of their willingness to pay as possible. We show that if the proportion of resident passengers is high enough, non-resident passengers may be expelled from the market. Taken into account this undesirable situation we compare ad valorem and lump sum subsidies. We conclude that if the proportion of passengers with high willingness to pay is low (high) enough applying a lump sum (ad valorem) subsidy for resident passengers is better in social terms. We apply these results to a specific case study in the Canary Islands where ad valorem subsidies for resident passengers have been extensively used. We conclude that in most routes the lump sum subsidy is undoubtedly better in social terms.

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Trade-offs between environmental regulation and market competition: airlines, emission trading systems and entry deterrence

Cristina Barbot, Ofelia Betancor, M. Pilar Socorro y M. Fernanda Viecens, 26/09/12

Emission trading systems (ETS) are being applied worldwide and in different economic sectors as an environmental regulatory tool that induces reductions of CO2 emissions. In Europe such a system is in place since 2005 for energy intensive installations and, since 1st January 2012, for airlines with flights arriving and departing from Community airports. The efficiency of the system should consider not only how it allows reaching an environmental goal, but also it should take into account its implications for market competition. In this work we develop a theoretical model that analyses the European ETS’s main features as devised for airlines, focusing on its effects on potential competition and entry deterrence. Contrary to other economic activities under ETS, potential competition is usual in most airline markets. Our results indicate that the share of capped allowances allocated initially for free to air operators may be a key element in deterring or allowing entry into the market. This result may be in collision with the general European principle of promoting competition and may represent a step backwards in the construction of a single European air transport market.

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Área de Infraestructuras, Transportes y Vivienda

Las opiniones recogidas en estos documentos son las de sus autores y no coinciden necesariamente con las de FEDEA.

Coordinado por Ginés de Rus